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Chapter 6
The Face of Judgement in Measure 
for Measure
Kevin Curran
As Bruce Smith points out in his lead essay to this volume, ‘face’ is 
both a noun and a verb – a thing and an action. Accordingly, the 
word denotes two different kinds of physicality. First, it names an 
object, one that can be seen, touched, listened to, even tasted (think 
of kissing). Second, it describes a way of orienting oneself in space 
and in relation to other objects (face me, face the wall, face forward, 
face each other). This verbal use of the word face – in which its noun-
form, its thing-quality, is also always active – frequently carries some 
kind of ethical freight, a sense of being called to account, of taking 
responsibility or of acknowledging what has yet to be acknowledged. 
We see this most vividly in common fi gurative uses of the word, such 
as ‘face the facts’ or ‘face the music’. In these phrases, face and facing 
have something to do with judgement and the kind of moral, social 
and practical calculus we all practise everyday, and which hopefully 
leads to the good, the right or at least the expedient outweighing the 
bad, the wrong or the undesirable. 
This connection between facing and judging is central to this essay. 
Specifi cally, I am interested in how the spatial, object-oriented gram-
mar of the face invites us to think of judgement less as an individual 
decision or rational cognitive procedure than as a physical, dimen-
sional event that involves orientating oneself in space and time. I will 
be referring to this as the ‘physics of judgment’ and my case study will 
be Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, in particular Act V, scene i, 
in which two faces – Mariana’s and Duke Vincento’s – are crucial 
to the play’s fi nal scene of condemnation and forgiveness. The the-
atre provides an especially compelling locale for thinking about the 
physics of judgement. Indeed, judgement shares with theatre its most 
basic raw materials: people and things arranged in space and time. 
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The face is crucial to this discussion because in Measure for Measure 
it stands at the crossroads of theatre and judgement, indexing their 
shared fi elds of location and duration and their common orientation 
toward the future. 
By following this line of inquiry, we stand to recover a version 
of judgement that has been largely missing from the intellectual 
discourse of the twentieth and twenty-fi rst centuries, one that is 
positive, future-oriented and world-making. As Vivasvan Soni has 
shown, both Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu viewed judgement 
as one of our most vexed inheritances from the Enlightenment – on 
one hand, an expression of reason and autonomy; on the other, a 
normative and normalising force used to police behaviour and iden-
tity.1 This account has had remarkable staying power. Even in every-
day life we tend to be uncomfortable with the idea of judgement, 
to view it, explicitly or implicitly, as judgemental. Right-or-wrong/
this-or-that interpretations are unsophisticated at best, boorish or 
unfair at worst. Humanities classrooms are primary sites for such 
thinking. Since the appearance of infl uential New Critical work like 
William Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity, and certainly since 
the rise of deconstruction, a commitment to multiplicity and open-
endedness has prevailed in higher education.2 This is hardly a prob-
lem in and of itself, but there are more troubling versions of this habit 
of thought. For example, we have all seen in recent years how clear 
instances of police brutality are sometimes met with admonitions to 
resist judgement and avoid jumping to conclusions as there are always 
two sides to every story. Discomfort with judgement does not belong 
solely to either the political left or the political right. Hannah Arendt 
was famously chastised by both liberals and conservatives when 
she publicly condemned a range of groups and individuals for the 
roles they played in the Holocaust. She recalls in a subsequent essay, 
‘I was told that judging itself is wrong: no one can judge who had 
not been there.’3 
It may seem strange to claim that a play whose fi nal scene of 
judgement is known for courting darkness, irrationality and ambi-
guity offers us a chance to recover a positive version of judgement. 
Modern critics have been uneasy about several aspects of the denoue-
ment, including the arbitrary betrothal of Isabella and the Duke and 
the near executions of Angelo and Lucio.4 But in arguing that the 
close of Measure for Measure models a positive version of judgement 
I am not suggesting that the denouement itself is uniformly positive 
or optimistic. More precisely, I wish to suggest that the play of faces 
in Act V, scene i of Measure for Measure usefully exposes one aspect 
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of Renaissance theatre’s unique and largely overlooked place in the 
history and theory of judgement. It does so by generating a choreog-
raphy of adjudication grounded in the physical and ethical dynam-
ics of mutual recognition and the corresponding possibility of new 
social formations.
Mariana’s face and the physics of judgement
I will begin by mapping out how the physics of judgement works 
in Act V, scene i. The scene brings together two deception plots. In 
both cases, the deception is justifi ed by the greater good for which 
it is committed. The fi rst of these involves Duke Vincento who 
throughout the play dresses as a friar to observe the behaviour of 
his subjects undetected. The other involves Mariana, a woman who 
was betrothed to, then abandoned by, Angelo, the hypocritically 
puritanical deputy fi lling in for the Duke. Mariana, Isabella and the 
Duke trick Angelo into consummating his marriage to Mariana by 
sending her to a garden-house where Angelo thinks he is having a 
tryst with Isabella. The collision of these two plots in the fi nal scene 
of the play leads to a series of revelations in which the face plays an 
essential role. 
The fi rst of these revelations occurs when, in the wake of Isabella’s 
accusations of sexual blackmail, Mariana is led onstage, supposedly 
to absolve Angelo of Isabella’s charges. Here is the initial part of the 
scene:
DUKE: Give us some seats.
    [Seats are brought in]
          Come, cousin Angelo,
    In this I’ll be impartial; be you judge
    Of your own cause.
       [The Duke and Angelo sit]
        Enter [Friar Peter with] Mariana [veiled]
          Is this the witness, friar? 
    First let her show her face, and after speak.
MARIANA: Pardon, my lord, I will not show my face
    Until my husband bid me. 
(V, i, 164–9)5 
This is clearly a scene of arbitration. A charge has been made and a 
witness is being brought in to testify. The Duke even has some seats 
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set up to make the exchange feel more like a trial with judge and jury 
presiding. We should also note that Mariana’s face is at the centre of 
this judgement-event. The Duke’s command, ‘First let her show her 
face, and after speak’, seems to assume that the forensic and moral 
evaluation integral to judgement is only possible under certain base-
line conditions of collective ethical orientation: the mutual acknowl-
edgement and recognition intrinsic to the face-to-face encounter. But 
Mariana refuses: ‘I will not show my face / Until my husband bid 
me’. A little further on, Angelo echoes the Duke’s request at which 
point Mariana fi nally acquiesces:
ANGELO: This is a strange abuse. Let’s see thy face.
MARIANA: My husband bids me; now I will unmask.
       [She shows her face]
    This is that face, thou cruel Angelo,
    Which once thou swor’st was worth the looking on . . . 
(V, i, 200–3)
There are two aspects of this exchange that are important for under-
standing the physics of judgement. To begin with, the component 
parts of this judgement-event consist predominantly of actions 
and reactions centred on Mariana’s veiled face. This stage business 
is marked verbally throughout: ‘give’, ‘come’, ‘show’, ‘not show’, 
‘let’s see’, ‘shows’. That is to say, Mariana’s face indexes the way the 
judgement-event unfolds in space. In addition – and this is the second 
aspect – Mariana’s face indexes the way the judgement-event unfolds 
through time. All terms pertaining to temporal positioning – what 
linguists call ‘time deixis’ – are used in reference to Mariana’s face: 
‘fi rst’, ‘after’, ‘until’, ‘now’.6 Here is the relevant passage once again, 
this time with time deixis marked in bold and references to Mariana’s 
face underlined:
            Is this the witness, friar?
   First let her show her face, and after speak.
MARIANA: Pardon, my lord, I will not show my face
   Until my husband bid me. 
(V, i, 166–9) 
                    . . .
ANGELO: This is a strange abuse. Let’s see thy face.
MARIANA: My husband bids me; now I will unmask.
      [She shows her face] 
(V, i, 200–1)
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Marking the exchange in this way highlights the peculiar theatrical 
role played by the face in this scene. Though obviously part of the 
actor’s and character’s body, the face also functions almost like a 
prop. It is instrumentalised in a way that exceeds the demands of 
character in order to advance elements of plot and theme. To this 
extent, the face muddles some of the standard categories of theat-
rical semiotics established by scholars such as Patrick Pavis, Erika 
Fischer-Lichte and Keir Elam. Consider some basic examples of 
these categories: linguistic signs, paralinguistic signs, kinesic signs 
and proxemic signs. Linguistic signs function both rhetorically and 
acoustically. They comprise both the meanings of individual words 
spoken on stage and the tone and pace of delivery. Paralinguistic 
signs, meanwhile, include such things as props, music, scenery and 
lighting. Kinesic signs are self-contained bodily movements such as 
gestures. Proxemic signs, on the other hand, are movements of bod-
ies through the space of the stage.7
Mariana’s face does not fi t in a straightforward way into any 
of these categories. Instead it performs two different kinds of 
signifi cation simultaneously – kinesic and proxemic – while also 
challenging received wisdom about how these signifying units are 
supposed to work. Mariana’s face is a kinesic sign in the way that 
all faces always are on stage, but the fact that it remains veiled for 
most of the exchange seriously undercuts its ability to do what 
kinesic signs are supposed to do: express or gesture. Mariana’s 
face is a proxemic sign to the extent that it occasions the scene’s 
primary actions and reactions. Indeed, it is at the centre of the 
scene’s orbit of movement. And yet it does very little in the way 
of signifi cant movement through space itself. A full semiotic reck-
oning of Mariana’s face would also require the addition of a new 
sign-category, the ‘chronemic’, which would allow us to isolate the 
face’s time-indexical function in the scene. As a chronemic sign, 
Mariana’s face is consistently pointing to the temporal context 
in which it appears. It creates a scene of judgement which does 
not manifest itself in a fl at present of decision, but rather unfolds 
sequentially through a linear process of action and response: ‘First 
let her show her face, and after speak’; ‘I will not show my face / 
Until my husband bid me’; ‘Now I will unmask’. 
The face in Measure for Measure bursts the seams of our received 
systems of theatrical interpretation. It demands a more fl exible and 
expansive set of critical concepts. As the material anchor in the 
fi nal scene’s culminating moments of punishment and forgiveness, 
it offers a vantage point from which we can observe the physics of 
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judgement at work, the way in which adjudication unfolds through 
the space and time of a mimetic environment comprised of bod-
ies, voices and objects. From this perspective, judgement takes the 
form of a collaborative event. It has less to do with individual evalu-
ation than with the collective application of knowledge toward a 
specifi c end. And as with all forms of applied knowledge – geom-
etry, mechanics, even rhetoric – the aim of judgement is to make 
something: in this case, a livable future, a shared sense of truth and 
new conditions of social possibility in Vienna. We see the begin-
ning of this process unfolding gradually during the scene of Mari-
ana’s unveiling: collective appraisal of the situation evolves as false 
knowledge and misperception gives way to true knowledge. The 
revelation of Mariana’s face is the hinge on which the former swings 
toward the latter. Here is the scene with references to knowledge – 
fi rst false, then true – set in bold:
MARIANA: Why just, my lord, and that is Angelo,
   Who thinks he knows that he ne’er knew my body,
   But knows, he thinks, that he knows Isabel’s.
ANGELO: This is a strange abuse. Let’s see thy face.
MARIANA: My husband bids me; now I will unmask.
        [She shows her face]
   This is that face, thou cruel Angelo,
   Which once thou swor’st was worth the looking on;
                    . . .
DUKE: Know you this woman?
                    . . .
ANGELO: My lord, I must confess I know this woman, 
(V, i, 197–203, 208, 212) 
This moment – the fi rst phase of Act V, scene i’s extended judgement-
event – marks the beginning of a shared coming-into-knowledge that 
I will continue to trace in the next section of this essay. Mariana’s 
unveiling and the acknowledgement it triggers – ‘I know this 
woman’ – establishes a new truth about the relations among the 
characters on stage that will lead eventually to fundamental changes 
in the social fabric of Shakespeare’s Vienna. We may tend to think 
of judgement as a singular decision or decree, something that ends 
or resolves things. But the dynamics of the face in Measure for Mea-
sure shows us something different: a version of judgement that is 
collective and creative, and which has as much to do with the future 
as with the past. 
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Practical judgement: facing, managing, making
So far I have made two connected claims. The fi rst is that in Measure 
for Measure the face is at the centre of something we might call the 
physics of judgement. The second is that by looking closely at how 
this process works on stage we can recover a version of judgement 
that is social and world-making. In this section, I will give more atten-
tion to the second claim. I will show, in particular, how theatrical 
judgement functions as a form of collective knowledge-management 
and conclude with some thoughts on the face as the source of judge-
ment’s future-oriented trajectory. 
On the Renaissance stage, judgement forms communities of 
knowledge. It does so by realigning the varying levels of informa-
tion possessed by characters and play-goers around a single, shared 
Truth. The friar is actually the Duke; there are two young men named 
Antipholus in town, not just one; this person who you thought was a 
boy is actually a young woman: these are all things that are disclosed 
through scenes of judgement. They constitute a specifi c version of the 
theatrical anagnorisis that Matthew Smith discusses in his contribu-
tion to this volume. These particular examples also indicate that cre-
ating, maintaining and fi nally redressing disparities in knowledge is 
especially important in comedy. At a basic mechanical level, humour 
is generated in stage comedy through the uneven evolution in the 
way sensory information is distributed among characters and play-
goers. What makes a play like The Comedy of Errors funny is the 
disconnect between what audience members see (Antipholus of Syra-
cuse) and what characters on stage see (Antipholus of Ephesus). The 
relationship between sense perception and knowledge is different for 
each of the two groups that together constitute theatrical experience. 
The same can be said for Act III, scene ii of A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream, in which Robin Goodfellow hides while imitating the voices 
of Lysander and Demetrius. Humour, again, is generated by a sim-
ple sensory disconnect: the play-goers can hear and see everything; 
Demetrius and Lysander can hear but not see. Typically, this discon-
nect is remedied in the play’s denouement. The end of The Comedy 
of Errors feels like a resolution because characters and spectators at 
last see and hear the same thing (this is Antipholus of Syracuse, that 
is Antipholus of Ephesus). Likewise at the end of Twelfth Night when 
Duke Orsino slowly comes to terms with the truth about ‘Cesario’, or 
the fi nal act of All’s Well that Ends Well where vision and hearing are 
once again revelatory. Shakespearean comedy depends for its effects 
on this carefully managed economy of perception and knowledge.8 
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In Measure for Measure, perception and knowledge are framed 
by the dynamics of judgement. That is, judgement is both the impe-
tus for and the result of the facial revelations that fi nally distribute 
knowledge evenly among each character on stage and the play-goers 
in the audience. The faces of Act V, scene i – the fi rst unveiled, the 
second unhooded – remind us that judgement is a fundamentally 
sensory and communal event: it begins with showing or revealing 
and ends with seeing, really seeing, together. We will recall that in 
the fi nal scene of Measure for Measure, the Duke says of the veiled 
Mariana, ‘First let her show her face’. Angelo agrees: ‘Let’s see thy 
face’. When Mariana concedes she says bitingly, ‘This is that face, 
thou cruel Angelo, / Which once thou swor’st was worth the looking 
on.’ First perception, then judgement, and somewhere in between a 
coming-into-knowledge for all present and the establishment of a 
new truth. Something similar happens when Lucio demands of the 
Duke (who he thinks is a friar), ‘Show your knave’s visage . . . Show 
your sheep-biting face’ (V, i, 337–8). When he ‘pulls off the Friar’s 
hood, and discovers the Duke’, the latter says, ‘Thou art the fi rst 
knave that e’er made’st a duke’ (V, i, 340). In a brief moment that 
cannot quite be parsed into sequential units, judgement descends on 
Lucio, a shared truth is established and a new community of knowl-
edge is formed. 
In our own time, in everyday contexts, to judge is to make a 
decision in response to information. But what we tend to miss is the 
way judgement also involves managing and distributing that infor-
mation. This dimension of judgement would have been familiar to 
many early moderns whose understanding of the concept derived 
primarily from the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition that was cen-
tral to humanist education. In oratory, especially in legal contexts, 
judgement was defi ned as the capacity to put information in the 
right order. Thomas Blundeville, for example, explains in The Art 
of Logicke (1599) that once ‘invention fi nds matter’, judgement 
‘frameth, disposeth, and reduceth the same into due forme of argu-
ment’.9 There are a variety of subspecies of judgement within the 
rhetorical tradition, some of which, like modestia, show us how 
judgement’s core functions of framing and disposing, managing and 
curating, were not restricted to oratorical or compositional contexts, 
but were also essential to an orderly and ethical life-practice. In 
Cicero’s De Offi ciis, for example – which was along with Aristotle’s 
Nichomachean Ethics the most infl uential study of virtue in the 
Renaissance – modestia is described as ‘the essence of orderliness 
and of right-placing’. Cicero also invokes the Stoics’ defi nition 
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of modestia as the ‘“science of disposing aright everything that 
is done or said” . . . “the arrangement of things in their suitable 
and appropriate places”’.10 The term Cicero uses for ‘right-placing’ 
and ‘“disposing aright”’ is collocation (collocationis and collocan-
darum, respectively, in Latin). For Cicero, collocation is a practice 
at once technical and ethical, both correct and good. It is essential 
to his notion of modestia as ‘the science of doing the right thing at 
the right time’. ‘Such orderliness of conduction’, he continues, ‘is, 
therefore, to be observed, that everything in the conduct of our life 
shall balance and harmonize.’11 In Measure for Measure, the face is 
at the centre of a process of collocation, of setting things right. The 
unveiling of Mariana and the unhooding of the Duke provide object 
lessons in accountability and occasion the redistribution of knowl-
edge that restores order to Vienna. This also reminds us how, in a 
general sense, comic dénouements are always moments of embod-
ied collocation. They represent one of several ways in which the 
rhetorical tradition of judgement became part of the genome of 
theatrical form. 
This much we know, then: the face of judgement in Measure for 
Measure is part of a dynamic, dimensional process of knowledge-
making and knowledge-management. This process involves both 
actors and audience and, as such, is fundamentally collective and 
collaborative. I want to conclude this section by refl ecting on 
how under these conditions judgement is also creative and future-
oriented. Toward this end, I return to the exchange between Lucio 
and the Duke:
LUCIO: . . . you must be hooded, must you? Show your knave’s 
visage, with a pox to you! Show your sheep-biting face, and be 
hanged an hour! Will’t not off?
     Lucio pulls off the Friar’s hood, and discovers the 
Duke . . .
DUKE: Thou art the fi rst knave that e’er mad’st a duke.
(V, i, 337–40)
The revelation of the Duke immediately changes the epistemolog-
ical, legal and social conditions of the play-world: Mariana and 
Isabella are confi rmed as truthful while Angelo is confi rmed as 
false; Angelo and Lucio are promptly assigned punishments; and 
marriages are arranged for Angelo and Mariana, Lucio and Kate 
Keepdown and the Duke himself and Isabella. For the characters 
assembled on stage, then, the judgement occasioned by the Duke’s 
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face completely remakes the world they had known. It leads to a 
new truth, a new source of moral authority and a new set of social 
relations. Judgement takes the raw materials of one world – people, 
ideas, connections and obligations – and reassembles them to form 
another. Through an extended judgement-event that begins with 
showing (‘let her show her face’; ‘she shows her face’; ‘show your 
knave’s visage’; ‘show your sheep-biting face’: ‘He . . . discovers 
the Duke’) and ends with adjudication, condemnation and for-
giveness, the lines of inclusion and exclusion are redrawn to form 
a version of community that did not exist when the play opened. 
Bastards are accommodated (the child of Lucio and Kate Keep-
down), the forsaken are acknowledged (Mariana), the guilty are 
forgiven (Angelo), the condemned are welcomed back (Claudio) 
and – more dubiously – the self-exiled are reintegrated (Isabella). 
This is the sense in which judgement is creative and future-oriented 
in Measure for Measure. Adjudication may, in one sense, be con-
cerned with assessing the past (past actions, past claims), but in so 
far as it triggers changes in behaviour, social arrangements and (in a 
juridical setting) legal precedent, judgement is also always directed 
toward the future; it is always about making. 
The capacity of judgement to make and create, thrown into sharp 
relief in Measure for Measure by the dynamics of the face, again fi nds 
its source in the rhetorical tradition. The Blundeville quotation cited 
above illustrates the well-established conceptual link between judge-
ment and invention: while ‘invention fi nds matter’, judgement ‘fra-
meth, disposeth, and reduceth the same into due forme of argument’. 
This formulation derives from Roman rhetorical theory which has 
deeper roots in Aristotle. Texts like Cicero’s De inventione, the anon-
ymous Rhetorica ad Herennium and Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria 
describe invention as the skill of deciding which line of reasoning is 
most likely to strike a particular audience as especially compelling. 
Judgement’s role is to break that line of reasoning down into compo-
nent parts and then arrange them in a sequence calculated to achieve 
maximum persuasiveness. Judgement, in other words, turns ideas 
into arguments by lending them organisational form. Along with 
invention, it was an essential component of what Aristotle termed 
the genus iudiciale, the kind of speech typically found in the law 
courts.12 In Shakespeare’s time, anyone with a grammar school edu-
cation was likely to have encountered rhetorical handbooks like De 
inventione, Rhetorica ad Herrenium and Institutio oratoria, or ver-
nacular manuals like Thomas Wilson’s The Art of Rhetorique (1553) 
which drew on the Roman handbooks.13 
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With this in mind, we can begin to see how judgement might be con-
ceived as one crucial point along a continuum of creative endeavour. 
For those with some training in rhetorical theory, judgement was a form 
of production rather than a form of decision, as we would now tend to 
view it. As a component of theatrical form, therefore, judgement’s role 
in plays like Measure for Measure is not simply to end things, but also 
to start things anew, to plot a future course and craft another world – a 
world that must fi nally take shape beyond the fi ctional parameters of 
the play itself.14 
Conclusion
My aim in this essay has been to determine what we can learn about 
judgement by attending to the dynamics of the face in Measure for 
Measure. This has involved working in the opposite direction of con-
ventional literary criticism. That is, rather than using a concept to 
give a reading of a play, I have tried to use a play to give a reading 
of concept. Accordingly, the take-away is not so much a new inter-
pretation of Measure for Measure, but rather a new way of thinking 
about judgement and its relationship to theatricality. As we have seen, 
the face in Measure for Measure functions as a deictic component 
of judgement, an action-object whose verbal and nominal capacities 
transform judgement into theatre by orienting it in time and space. 
Indeed, the face reminds us that judgement is fundamentally the-
atrical, though not in the ways typically asserted by cultural criti-
cism: judgement is not theatrical because courtrooms are kind of like 
theatres or because juries are kind of like play audiences. Instead, 
judgement is theatrical because it is constituted by the same basic 
raw materials as theatre: time, space and action. The face indexes this 
shared physics of experience. 
When we look judgement in the face, we see that it is not simply 
a unidirectional administrative procedure (as in law) or a singular 
confrontation with absolute authority (as in religion). More accu-
rately, judgement is a participatory practice that forms communities 
by translating common sensory experience (seeing, showing, look-
ing, hearing) into common axes of value (a shared sense of right 
and wrong, good and bad). In the arch of its unfolding, judgement 
starts as evaluation and ends as values, reminding us that the etymo-
logical link between those two words fi nds its source in a common 
conceptual space where calculation and community are neighbours. 
The particular determinations of Act V, scene i – Mariana is owed 
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something, Lucio owes something to others, Claudio is innocent, 
Angelo is guilty – reinforce general ethical principles of obligation, 
responsibility and justice that make social life possible. The close of 
Measure for Measure, in other words, shows us how assessment can 
generate the shared standards that form the moral scaffolding of 
community. This positive and creative notion of judgement, iterated 
theatrically through the dynamics of the face, may have been famil-
iar to early moderns trained in rhetoric. But it is far removed from 
the more punitive, categorical and normative sense of judgement 
that dominates the discourse of our own time. 
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